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Abstract
Meta-ethical realism faces the serious epistemological problem of how to explain 
our epistemic access to moral reality. In the face of this challenge many are scepti-
cal about non-naturalist realism. Nonetheless, there is good reason to acknowledge 
moral objectivity: morality shows all the signs of a truth-apt discourse but doesn’t 
exhibit the typical relativity inducing features. This suggests a middle-ground posi-
tion, a theory that embraces the virtues of realism but does avoid its vices: objectiv-
ist antirealism. In this paper, I’ll discuss, mainly following Crispin Wright’s account 
of moral truth as superassertibility, a promising version of objectivist antirealism 
and show how to cope with notorious problems, notably those arising from the 
thought that moral disagreement might be possible in which nobody is guilty of a 
cognitive shortcoming, which contradicts the antirealist claim that moral truth is not 
beyond our epistemic reach. The solution is to deny the possibility of cognitively 
faultless moral disagreement by arguing that cognitively blameless thinkers either 
agree or stay agnostic and, therefore, never disagree about any moral proposition. 
Since assuming an agnostic stance on the part of such thinkers contradicts the anti-
realist’s conception of truth—even within the limits of intuitionistic logic—I’ll pro-
pose an alternative logical revision for the moral discourse: a three-valued logic with 
epistemically construed truth-values.
1  Introduction: Realism, the Problem of Epistemic Access and Moral 
Objectivity
How do we attain moral knowledge? Genuine moral facts or properties, if there are 
any, are supposed to be causally inert. So knowledge about them seems impossible. 
This, of course, is true only if knowledge presupposes causal contact with the rel-
evant facts or properties, at least indirectly. The thesis that genuine moral facts are 
part of the furniture of the universe is in epistemological troubles: the proponent of 
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such a view, i.e. the non-naturalist or robust realist, does not seem to be in a position 
to explain how knowledge about moral facts is possible.1 A particularly important 
epistemological challenge to robust realism, therefore, is to account for our epis-
temic access to and our knowledge about moral reality. As already noted, the chal-
lenge thus stated presupposes a theory of knowledge that poses a causal condition 
on knowledge—and such theory is not uncontroversial (see e.g. Clarke-Doane 2012; 
Enoch 2011: 154, esp. footnote 8). But how not put this epistemological challenge 
in terms of knowledge, causal contact, epistemic access or some such? Recently 
David Enoch (2011: 158–165) stated an alternative and more general version of the 
challenge at dispute, which is couched in terms of a correlation between our moral 
beliefs and the moral facts: the robust realist has to show that there is a more than 
accidental link between our (justified) true moral beliefs and the moral facts, i.e. a 
probability (significantly) higher than random probability for our moral beliefs to be 
true, so that they are not just flukes. If robust realists are not in a position to explain 
that correlation, any epistemic justification they may have had for their moral beliefs 
is defeated or undermined. Enoch (2011, ch. 7) presents an evolutionary solution to 
this correlation challenge. It is a third-factor explanation of the correlation between 
our moral beliefs and the moral facts in which evolution plays the role of the third 
“pre-establishing” factor: the selective forces of evolution have shaped our moral 
beliefs and the same forces also brought forth the survival of the human species, and, 
since evolution’s “achievement”, viz. the survival of our species, is good, evolution 
is closely (enough) related to the (other) moral facts. However, this sort of explana-
tion raises serious questions of various kinds (cf. Behrends 2013; Braddock 2016; 
Enoch 2011; ch. 7, Sepielli 2012). Is the (kind of) goodness of evolution’s “achieve-
ment”, i.e. the survival of the Homo sapiens, really relevant to morality? Is the rela-
tion between evolution’s “achievement” and its (allegedly moral) goodness not by 
itself an inexplicable random coincidence, a “miracle”? Is it really the case that the 
patterns of behaviour conducive to the survival of our species are morally good, 
rather than “neutral” or even (in part) morally wrong? Is the correlation between 
the (alleged) fact that our evolutionary survival is good and the huge amount of the 
(other) moral facts not too weak to bear the explanatory burden of the evolutionary 
explanation of the correlation between our moral beliefs and the moral facts? And 
does this evolutionary explanation not involve a vicious circle, since the explanation 
itself relies on moral beliefs in order to explain the reliability of our moral beliefs? 
The bottom line is that the evolutionary solution is highly speculative in various 
respects and, on the whole, shows too many imponderables. Even die-hard realists, 
as Enoch (ibid.), concede that, from an epistemological point of view, robust realism 
loses plausibility (points) as opposed to antirealist (and also naturalist) positions, 
which have the resources to easily explain the relevant correlation and to solve the 
1 Meta-ethical non-natural or robust realism is the following thesis (cf. Enoch 2011: 3f): moral beliefs 
have truth-apt contents some of which are true in virtue of moral facts, which exist independently of us 
in relevant ways, notably independent of our (actual or idealized) attitudes and beliefs about them, and 
the moral contents and facts are not reducible to contents or facts of other kinds, notably not reducible to 
natural (physical, biological, psychological, sociological) contents or facts.
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problem of moral knowledge and epistemic access (since there is no genuine moral 
realm to be accessed in the first place). Yet antirealist theories—notably the well-
established varieties: non-cognitivism, relativism, fictionalism, error theory—face 
serious troubles as well and so, too, lose plausibility (points) in other areas. Most of 
the antirealist’s problems are due to her denial of moral objectivity2: morality shows 
all the signs of a truth-apt discourse but doesn’t exhibit the typical relativity induc-
ing features, like e.g. discourse about matters of taste does. So, the claim that moral 
sentences aren’t truth-apt, the claim that there are no moral truths and the claim that 
moral truth is relative (to a perspective or some such) are highly contestable and in 
need of thorough but so far yet outstanding underpinning. Hence, it is fair to say, a 
meta-ethical theory would be at an advantage that avoids both the epistemological 
problems of realism and the problems of the various shapes of antirealism, at least 
those problems due to their denial of moral objectivity. Such middle-ground theory 
would combine a rejection of realism with acknowledging moral objectivity: objec-
tivist antirealism. The challenge, of course, is to coherently state such a position in 
the first place. In this paper, I’ll outline this objectivist antirealism, which is based 
on Crispin Wright’s antirealist or epistemic conception of moral truth, and I’ll argue 
that it can be stated coherently and defend it against notorious objections, notably 
one that arises from the assumption that rationally irresolvable, or cognitively fault-
less, moral disagreement is possible.
Since the course of argument in this paper is quite intricate and leads the reader 
into some side branches and dead ends, it might be helpful to outline the argument 
in more detail than is perhaps usual on these occasions.
In the next section, I delineate my favoured objectivist antirealism, clarify key 
concepts and discuss and refute certain objections to this position, which represents 
a middle-ground view between the extremes of non-cognitivism/relativism and real-
ism. In Sect. 3, I present the argument from faultless disagreement and the related 
EC-deduction introduced by Crispin Wright. This argument is supposed to refute the 
pre-theoretically plausible assumption that cognitively faultless moral disagreement 
is possible. Following a thought of Folke Tersman’s, I now show how the realist is 
able to escape the argument and can thus acknowledge the possibility of faultless 
disagreement: she can draw on an equivocation regarding knowability (of a moral 
truth). Within the framework of objectivist antirealism, however, this manoeuvre 
does not succeed, as I will show: In this framework, the possibility of faultless disa-
greement due to the epistemic conception of truth leads to contradiction. The advo-
cate of objectivist antirealism must therefore deny this possibility and explain why 
this pre-theoretical intuition is misleading. In Sect. 4, I propose a solution: Instead 
of acknowledging that because of the now admitted impossibility of faultless disa-
greement any moral disagreement is solvable and in principle a moral agreement can 
be found (by cognitively faultless thinkers), the proponent of objectivist antirealism 
2 Moral objectivity is understood here as comprising the following features: (a) moral sentences are 
truth-apt, (b) some of them are true, (c) they express genuine or irreducibly moral propositions, (d) prop-




should claim that cognitively faultless thinkers would adopt an agnostic stance with 
respect to those moral propositions they cannot agree on. This would explain why 
we have the intuition that cognitively faultless disagreement is possible, but at the 
same time one can deny this possibility, since faultless thinkers would have no disa-
greement at all as regards the relevant propositions (since they would be agnostic). 
But even this suggestive solution is not available in objectivist antirealism because 
of its epistemic conception of truth: the assumption of agnostic faultless thinkers 
with respect to a certain proposition implies a contradiction. Preliminary conclu-
sion: the adherent of objectivist antirealism must deny the possibility of faultless 
moral disagreement and at the same time acknowledge that any moral disagreement 
can in principle be solved by the parties reaching a moral agreement. But the lat-
ter in particular is highly implausible: it seems to arise more from optimism and 
wishful thinking than from any convincing argument. That is why I reject this solu-
tion. Objectivist antirealism therefore seems to have failed. In Sect. 5, I discuss an 
attempt to ward off this failure, which attempts to prevent the contradictions men-
tioned above by means of logical revision: the weakening of classical logic, which 
was hitherto assumed for moral discourse, to intuitionistic logic. But I also show 
why this solution does not work. Therefore, in the last Sect. 6, I propose a more radi-
cal logical solution, which seems to be the only remaining one for objectivist anti-
realism: the abandonment of classical logic in favour of a trivalent logic with epis-
temically construed truth values that congenially correspond to the truth conception 
of objectivist antirealism. This proposal can only be understood programmatically in 
the context of this paper: it is intended to encourage future (logical) research in this 
direction and to establish the middle-ground position of objectivist antirealism more 
strongly in the meta-ethical discourse.
2  Objectivist Antirealism: Moral Truth as Stable Warrantability
Traditionally objectivist antirealism has been put forward as a coherence theory 
of truth or as Peircean pragmatism or similar accounts. These antirealist theories 
are objectivist in that they, when applied to moral discourse, countenance genuine, 
irreducible moral propositions, some of which are supposed to be true, and con-
ceive of their truth as a (allegedly) non-relative property, e.g. as maximum coher-
ence, as rational acceptability under ideal epistemic conditions or as justifiability 
at the ideal limit of (scientific) investigation. However, those theories have been the 
target of much criticism, notably due to the (kind of) idealization they involve and 
their global claim. The antirealist theory to be considered here, however, is a more 
recent development that tries to avoid both the problematic type of idealization and 
the global approach: Crispin Wright’s epistemic conception of truth (Wright 1992, 
1996, 2002, 2006). It is a substantial account of truth that identifies moral truth, 
i.e. the property or nature of truth in the moral domain, with an epistemic prop-
erty, viz. stable warrantability, that Wright has termed superassertibility. This is 
intended as a local claim, i.e. a claim about truth in the moral domain alone, so that 
this antirealism for the moral discourse would not entail antirealism in some other 
region of discourse. Thus, in order to avoid global antirealism, the antirealist has to 
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presuppose alethic pluralism (cf. Edwards 2011, 2012a, b; Pedersen 2010, 2012a, 
b; Lynch 2009). This, in short, is the view that there is just one concept of truth—
which is a minimal or metaphysically neutral concept governed by so-called plati-
tudes or truisms—but different properties of being true, or manifestations of it in 
virtue of which propositions are true, depending on the selected region of discourse. 
In detail, alethic pluralism comprises the following two claims (following Wright 
1992: 24–36):
Minimalism The concept of truth is a minimal concept. That is to say, it is solely 
determined by a set of very general and intuitive principles, so-called platitudes, 
which are metaphysically neutral and connect truth to other concepts, e.g. the plati-
tude that to assert is to present as true, that a belief is true just in case things are 
as they are believed to be and so on. The platitudes build up an analytic theory, or 
a network analysis, of the concept of truth. Consequently, any correct substantial 
account of truth that proposes to define the nature of truth, or the property of being 
true, has to satisfy the platitudes. If so it is a model of the analytic theory.
Pluralism The nature, or property, of truth may be different depending on the 
selected region of discourse. That is, over and above the minimal features of truth 
expressed by the platitudes there are extra features determining the domain-specific 
or local nature of truth in some targeted region of discourse, which may vary from 
region to region. There is no nature of truth across all areas, but possibly different 
properties depending on the selected region; and any such property is a model of the 
analytic theory provided it satisfies the platitudes.3
Hence, within a pluralist framework, moral truth may have an evidentially con-
straint and mind-dependent nature, whereas e.g. the truth of statements about the 
physical world is, or is manifested by, an evidentially unconstrained and mind-inde-
pendent property. In particular, moral truth may be a somehow idealized epistemic 
property that is constructed out of ordinary epistemic properties such as warrantabil-
ity or coherence.
There are two prominent accounts of moral truth of this shape, which are closely 
related: Crispin Wright’s conception of truth as superassertibility (Wright 1992, 
2003, 2006) and Michael Lynch’s conception of truth as concordance, a specific 
shape of supercoherence (Lynch 2009).4 Superassertibility is assertibility not in 
some ideal, limiting state of information, but stable assertibility, i.e. the property of 
being warrantable in some actually accessible state of information and remaining so 
no matter what enlargements or improvements are made to it. Supercoherence is not 
maximum coherence, but the property of being coherent with some framework, e.g. 
3 The pluralist accounts of Wright and Lynch differ in a certain respect that, however, is irrelevant for 
our discussion: on Wright’s view, there is one concept of truth but there are possibly different proper-
ties of being true such that “true” or “truth” may designate different properties when used in different 
regions of discourse, whereas, according to Lynch, there is just one generic property of being true, which 
is a functional property, but there are possibly multiple manifestations of it, i.e. different domain-spe-
cific properties of propositions in virtue of which they are true. This difference is recently discussed as 
the distinction between strong and modest forms of pluralism (cf. Pedersen 2012b; Pedersen and Wright 
2013).
4 But see also Dorsey’s coherence theory of truth in the moral discourse (Dorsey 2006).
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some moral framework, and remaining so no matter what improvements are made 
to the initial framework. Concordance of a moral judgement is the property of being 
supercoherent with some moral framework combined with the truth of the morally 
relevant non-moral judgements of that framework (Lynch 2009: 176). In what fol-
lows, I’ll confine myself to superassertibility, but nothing relevant for the discussion 
hinges on my choice instead of concordance (actually it will turn out that concord-
ance is a special case of superassertibility). Wright introduces a range of concepts of 
superassertibility, rather than one single concept (cf. Wright 1992: 68), depending 
on the (perhaps domain-specific) interpretation of some key concepts or the range 
of the states-of-information quantifier employed in the definition of superassertibil-
ity; and he presents the definition in slightly different versions (Wright 1992: 48, 
2003: 199, 2006: 56). For my purposes I distil the following working definition of 
superassertibility:
(S)  P is superassertible iff there is some accessible state of information S such that 
P is warrantable in S and remains so no matter what enlargements or other 
forms of improvement are made to S
An accessible state of information, in the moral realm, consists of a sufficiently 
coherent set of moral beliefs as well as morally relevant non-moral, especially 
empirical, beliefs which a person could acquire in the actual world (with its actual 
biological, neurological, psychological laws) under sufficiently favorable epistemic 
conditions (cf. Edwards 1996: 105–108; Wright 1992: 67–68).
Notoriously, two main problems arise for this (type of) definition of superassert-
ibility (see e.g. Edwards 1996: 105–108; Wright 1992: 67–68): the first regards the 
question as to what is an accessible state of information, in particular as regards 
morality, and the second concerns the concept of enlargement or improvement (of 
a state of information) and the range of the corresponding states-of-information 
quantifier. The first problem has a straightforward solution for the moral domain. 
An accessible state of information, as mentioned in the definition of moral superas-
sertibility, can be conceived of as consisting of two components that are interwoven: 
first, a sufficiently coherent set of moral beliefs achievable by some thinker T at time 
t on the basis of her actual beliefs and, second, a set of morally relevant non-moral, 
notably empirical information available to T at t, i.e. a set of non-moral beliefs that 
would be, in the world as it actually is, generated in T at t by investigating in suffi-
ciently favourable epistemic circumstances. The second problem, however, is more 
intricate. Nevertheless, I think that it can be given a quite satisfactory solution for 
the moral domain we are dealing with here. First, in definition (S), i.e. in the second 
half of the definiens, the quantification runs over all enlargements and other forms 
of improvement of some state of information. So, something has to be said about the 
range of this universal states-of-information quantifier. The following seems to be 
a plausible restriction: any enlarged or otherwise improved state of information, as 
any state of information mentioned or quantified over in the definition, is conceived 
of in such manner that it is accessible to somebody at some time in the world as it 
actually is. That is to say, enlargements and other forms of improvement are con-
ceived of as, in principle, achievable in this world by human beings. This feature of 
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improvement is decisive in the light of a certain objection against the identification 
of truth with superassertibility: the argument from defeated warrant originally pre-
sented by Skorupski (1988: 522). The argument says that for any state of informa-
tion S it is conceivable that a statement P may be warranted in S, lose its warrant in 
some improvement of S and regain warrant in some further improvement. Since it 
seems to be quite plausible that P is true—the single intermediate gap of warrant 
in the chain of improvements should not threaten its truth status—P presumably is 
a true statement that isn’t superassertible. This objection can be refuted as follows: 
P in fact is superassertible, because there is some state of information available to 
some thinker based on which P is stably warrantable, since, by my definition of 
improvement, any improvement of a state of information is a state that is accessible 
to somebody at some time. So whenever an intermediate gap of warrant appears in 
the chain of improvements of S, any state of information subsequent to this gap is 
accessible to some thinker—and, therefore, P is superassertible.5
In addition to this actual achievability of any improved state of information, we 
can model the process of enlargement or improvement as an endless tree the root 
of which is the state of information available to somebody at some time and the 
knots are states of information such that any state on the tree is better than its pre-
decessors. Since, in what follows, I’ll consider enlargement to be a special case of 
improvement, I’ll simply talk of improved or better states of information. So, the 
crucial question is: when is a state of information better than another state of infor-
mation? It is natural to think of improving one’s state of information in terms of 
increasing one’s knowledge or approaching the truth. However, as regards the moral 
part of information at least, i.e. the relevant set of moral beliefs, we cannot con-
ceive of improvement as a process that, inter alia, enhances the moral knowledge or 
approaches the moral truth, since then our characterization or grasp of the nature of 
moral truth in terms of superassertibility would be defective, viz. viciously circular: 
in order to grasp the nature of moral truth in terms of superassertibility we already 
need to have a grasp of what constitutes the truth of a moral belief, i.e. a grasp of the 
nature of moral truth. So, in defining the concept of improvement of moral “infor-
mation” we must avoid notions such as those of knowledge or truth. A straightfor-
ward definition might be given in terms of increasing coherence (cf. Lynch 2009: 
172): improving moral information, i.e. a set of moral beliefs, is increasing its 
overall coherence.6 As regards the non-moral, notably empirical part of informa-
tion, however, we can make use of the concept of knowledge or truth, i.e. empirical 
knowledge or truth, provided that empirical truth isn’t identified with superassert-
ibility. That is to say, the process of improvement of a (finite) state of information 
is the process of improving the morally relevant non-moral, empirical knowledge, 
5 The only problematic case seems to be a gap of warrant that appears over and over again, so that there 
is no state of information based on which P is stably warrantable. But in this case, it is more than doubt-
ful whether P is true at all.
6 For the problem how to define coherence see Lynch 2009 (pp. 164–168) and his list of “coherence-
making features” (p. 167), which are: mutual explanatory support, predictive power, simplicity, com-
pleteness and consistency. A framework grows in coherence iff, on balance, it shows more of these fea-
tures or some of them to a greater degree (ibid. p. 171).
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i.e. acquiring true empirical information relevant for one’s moral judgements and 
abandoning false empirical beliefs, while increasing the coherence of the overall 
state of information. Superassertibility thus conceived comes close to Lynch’s con-
cept of concordance (Lynch 2009: 176). In fact, concordance is a special case of 
superassertibility, which is neutral with respect to the question as to what constitutes 
moral warrant or what type of epistemology should be adopted. If one takes, as is 
naturally suggested within an antirealist framework, coherentism to be the episte-
mology of choice for the moral domain, moral superassertibility as defined above is 
concordance.
3  The Argument from Faultless Disagreement and the EC‑Deduction
Objectivist antirealism, however, faces a serious problem that is based on the argu-
ment from faultless disagreement—an argument that originally has been put forward 
against meta-ethical realism but ultimately applies to any objectivist position. The 
argument is this. There are moral disagreements, e.g. the on-going disagreement 
between those who morally disapprove of medically assisted suicide and its propo-
nents, which seem to be irresolvable by rational means: no matter what improve-
ments of the state of information and what improvements of the cognitive or epis-
temic abilities of the parties involved in the disagreement we might imagine, the 
disagreement seems to be intractable. And even if these improvements might be 
thought of as leading to an all-encompassing state of information and to cognitive 
or epistemic perfection, we still are inclined to believe in the disagreement’s rational 
irresolvability. And this pre-theoretic thought that cognitively faultless moral disa-
greement is possible builds the main premise of the argument from faultless disa-
greement, which says that the following cannot be ruled out a priori:
(CFD)  There are possible cases of cognitively faultless moral disagreement
And CFD yields a contradiction, in conjunction with two further premises. One 
premise is the in-principle accessibility of moral truth, i.e. the thought that moral 
truth is not beyond our reach and does not transcend our cognitive faculty. Wright 
(1992, 2002) terms it the evidential or epistemic constraint on moral truth:
(EC)  For any moral proposition P: if P, then it is feasible to know that P
The other premise is what I call the Error Principle:
(EP)  To believe the negation of something knowable, or to believe something the 
negation of which is knowable, does involve a cognitive shortcoming
So, the argument from faultless disagreement can be captured by a version of 
Wright’s Simple Deduction, viz. his EC-Deduction, in which he only tacitly employs 
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the Error Principle (for deriving line (5) from line (4) within his own presentation of 
the deduction). The EC-Deduction essentially runs as follows7:
(1) A believes that P and B believes that not-P,
and neither has any cognitive shortcoming CFD
(2) If P, then it is feasible to know that P EC
(3) To believe the negation of something feasibly knowable,
or to believe something the negation of which is feasibly
knowable, does involve a cognitive shortcoming EP
(4) P Ass. for RAA 
(5) B believes the negation of something feasibly knowable (1), (2), (4)
(6) B has a cognitive shortcoming (3), (5)
(7) Not-P (1), (4), (6), RAA 
(8) A believes something the negation of which is feasibly knowable (1), (2), (7)
(9) A has a cognitive shortcoming (3), (8)
Provided the deduction is sound, at least one of its premises, CFD, EC or EP, is 
false and must be rejected.
A promising strategy to rebut this argument is to reject EP (for details 
see  Harth 2018 and Tersman 2006: 63–82): one can believe the negation of a 
feasibly knowable proposition without having a cognitive shortcoming.8 Suppose 
P is feasibly knowable and a thinker T believes the negation of P. Does T neces-
sarily have a cognitive shortcoming? It doesn’t seem so. The reason is that T’s 
cognitive faultlessness alone does not guarantee that T believes only true propo-
sitions. Put differently, accessibility of truth does not mean that necessarily any 
cognitively faultless thinker has the belief or acquires the knowledge in ques-
tion. Cognitive faultlessness does not imply that a cognitively faultless thinker 
necessarily acquires solely true beliefs. For cognitive faultlessness at most guar-
antees that one has (all relevant) correct starting points, e.g. moral intuitions 
or moral perceptions (if there are any), and is guilty of no epistemic shortcom-
ing, i.e. doesn’t make inferential mistakes. Yet epistemic faultlessness does not 
guarantee the truth of all the conclusions derived from the starting points, or the 
beliefs they immediately generate, if the epistemic process starting off with these 
beliefs involves non-deductive, i.e. non-truth-preserving inference, e.g. inductive 
7 This is my version of the deduction in which I made explicit all its premises for a better assessment.
8 What exactly is a cognitive shortcoming? For our purposes here it might suffice to say this. A cogni-
tive shortcoming can be regarded as any defectiveness that must add to the mere holding of a false belief 
(which in itself is not a cognitive shortcoming) in order that one holds the false belief in the first place, 
so that the shortcoming is located somewhere in the pedigree of a (false) belief. For further illumination, 
a list of paradigmatic cases of cognitive shortcoming might helpful (see also Enoch 2009: 41; Tersman 
1998: 360; Tersman 2006: 67): inferential mistakes, i.e. logical errors and illegitimate non-deductive 
inferences, hasty conclusions, mistakes in weighting, rating or balancing reasons and counter-argu-
ments, lack of intellectual rigor and conceptual accurateness, lack of astuteness, insufficient intellectual 
power, e.g. to grasp higher complexities, lack of ingenuity and imagination, e.g. for creating and apply-
ing thought experiments, and for finding new hypotheses, conclusions, reasons, objections and counter-
examples (for more details see Author’s Paper II).
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inference or inference to the best explanation. And if one abandons such start-
ing points at all (as epistemological coherentists do), but does solely countenance 
so-called considered judgements or initially credible beliefs to start the search 
for a reflective equilibrium or a maximum coherent system of beliefs (cf. Brun 
2014; Daniels 1979; Elgin 2005; Rawls 1951, 1971), then different such judge-
ments or beliefs might lead (especially in conjunction with non-deductive rea-
soning) to divergent and incompatible reflective equilibria or maximum coherent 
systems of beliefs. So cognitively faultless thinkers, in addition, have to make 
suitable considered judgements, or have to hold suitable initially credible beliefs, 
or they have to make suitable non-deductive inferences, in order to really acquire 
moral knowledge. Accordingly, Tersman (2006: 70–71) points to an important 
distinction as regards the notion, or notions, of epistemic inaccessibility: weak 
and strong inaccessibility. Since inaccessibility is the denial of accessibility, the 
distinction can also be couched in terms of strong and weak accessibility, respec-
tively. Given the truth of a proposition P, strong and weak accessibility of P are:
(ACS)  Necessarily, for any thinker T: if T is cognitively faultless, T knows that P
(ACW)  Possibly, some cognitively faultless thinkers know that P
EC is only plausible in the weak sense of accessibility,  (ACW), since whether 
or not a cognitively faultless thinker acquires knowledge of P might, in addition 
to her cognitive blamelessness, also depend on the suitability of her considered 
judgements (initially credible beliefs) and her non-deductive inferences. Whereas 
the Error Principle, EP, is uncontested only in the strong sense of accessibil-
ity  (ACS): it only involves a cognitive shortcoming to belief the negation of a 
proposition that any cognitively faultless thinker necessarily knows or to believe 
a proposition the negation of which any cognitively faultless thinker necessar-
ily knows. This holds by definition of strong accessibility. And since for EC and 
EP two different notions of accessibility must be employed, the EC-Deduction is 
not sound because of equivocation. So, we seem to be in a position to block the 
EC-Deduction. The possibility of unsuitable initially credible beliefs and unsuita-
ble non-deductive inferences explains why the Error Principle doesn’t hold when 
read it in the weak sense of “knowable”. So, it explains why even a cognitively 
faultless thinker might believe the negation of a proposition that is knowable or 
might believe a proposition the negation of which is knowable–knowable in the 
weak sense, of course: knowable for somebody with suitable considered judge-
ments or suitable non-deductive inferences.
The upshot is, realists are able to block the EC-Deduction, and so to rebut the 
argument from faultless disagreement: they might accept its premises, CFD, EC 
and EP, but claim an equivocation as regards epistemic accessibility, by distin-
guishing two different such notions as employed in EC and EP: weak and strong 
accessibility.
Although antirealists put forward the argument from faultless disagreement 
against realism, the contradiction derived by the EC-Deduction does not challenge 
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realism in particular; it rather challenges any meta-ethical position that ascribes 
objectivity to moral judgements. So, our objectivist antirealist has to block the 
deduction as well. And, at first glance, she seems to succeed in the same manner as 
the realist, viz. by accepting the premises but claiming an equivocation as regards 
knowability. For, although antirealist truth is defined in epistemic terms and so is 
epistemically constrained, the antirealist definition of moral truth, (S), does not 
imply the strong reading of EC, but at most the weak EC: if P is true, possibly, there 
is some cognitively faultless thinker who knows that P. For, recall, moral truth is 
defined thus: a moral proposition P is true just in case there is some thinker T hav-
ing a state of information S such that P is warrantable in S and remains so no matter 
what improvements are made to S. Thus, the objectivist antirealist is not committed 
to accepting the strong EC. And since EP is only plausible in the strong reading—it 
only involves a cognitive shortcoming to belief the negation of a proposition that 
any cognitively faultless thinker knows or to believe a proposition the negation of 
which any cognitively faultless thinker knows—the objectivist antirealist seems to 
be able to block the EC-Deduction: by accepting the premises but drawing on an 
equivocation as regards knowability.
Unfortunately, however, this solution is not available to the objectivist antirealist, 
since for her—in contrast to the realist—CFD poses the following problem. If cog-
nitively faultless disagreement is possible, then a disagreement is possible in which 
a thinker A might stably warrant P and another thinker B might stably warrant not-P. 
So, if CFD holds, it is possible that both P and not-P are superassertible. Put dif-
ferently, within our objectivist, i.e. especially non-relativist antirealist framework, 
CFD implies that P and not-P might be true together—a contradiction. Thus, within 
the objectivist camp, the realist alone is in a position to block the EC-Deduction by 
drawing on an equivocation as regards knowability. The objectivist antirealist, in 
contrast, has to reject CFD and, in addition, has to explain why this pre-theoretic 
thought is misguided.
4  An Objectivist Antirealist Rejection of CFD: The Agnostic Move
The discussion so far has shown this. An advocate of objectivist antirealism must deny 
the possibility of faultless moral disagreement since this possibility leads her into con-
tradiction. And moreover, she must explain why the pre-theoretical intuition in favour 
of this possibility is misleading. In the rest of the paper I will argue as follows. Instead 
of acknowledging that—because of the impossibility of faultless disagreement—any 
moral disagreement is solvable and in principle a moral agreement can be found, the 
proponent of objectivist antirealism might make the agnostic move, as I call it: she 
might claim that cognitively faultless thinkers would adopt an agnostic stance with 
respect to moral propositions they cannot agree on. This would explain why we have 
the intuition that cognitively faultless disagreement is possible, but at the same time 
one can deny this possibility, since faultless thinkers would have no disagreement at 
all as regards the relevant propositions. But even this suggestive solution is not avail-
able to objectivist antirealism, again because of its epistemic conception of truth: the 
assumption of agnostic faultless thinkers implies a contradiction. The preliminary 
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conclusion is: the adherent of objectivist antirealism must deny the possibility of fault-
less moral disagreement and at the same time acknowledge that any moral disagree-
ment can in principle be resolved by the parties reaching a moral agreement. But the 
latter is highly implausible: it seems to arise more from optimism or wishful think-
ing than from any convincing argument. That is why I reject this solution. Objectivist 
antirealism therefore seems to have failed. Yet, I’ll discuss an attempt to ward off this 
failure, which tries to prevent the contradictions mentioned above by means of a logi-
cal revision: the weakening of classical logic to intuitionistic logic. But this solution 
does not work. Therefore, at the end of the paper, I will propose a more radical logi-
cal solution, which seems to be the only remaining one for objectivist antirealism: the 
abandonment of classical logic in favour of a trivalent logic.
So, let’s start with our conclusion from the previous section: objectivist antireal-
ists must reject the possibility of faultless disagreement. The prospects for such a 
rejection, however, seem to be dim. Which resources might the objectivist antire-
alist have for a convincing denial of CFD? It is utterly unpromising to argue that 
all cognitively faultless thinkers would agree on every moral proposition. Such an 
assumption seems to be guided by sheer optimism and to be based on wishful think-
ing, rather than on any compelling argument, especially in the light of the afore-
mentioned considerations concerning the rejection of the Error Principle: diverg-
ing initially credible beliefs and divergent non-deductive inferences might lead even 
cognitively faultless thinkers to mutually incompatible moral conclusions (cf. also 
Loeb 1998). The only option objectivist antirealists seem to have is to argue that 
cognitively faultless thinkers would stay agnostic about some moral proposition—in 
the face of their knowledge that another cognitively faultless thinker would disa-
gree about that proposition. According to this agnostic-stance assumption, cogni-
tively faultless disagreement is not possible, because cognitively faultless thinkers 
either agree on a moral proposition or stay agnostic about it, and so do not disagree 
about any moral proposition. This agnostic move, or an argument to that effect, is 
required anyway: our objectivist antirealist has to rule out the possibility that both 
P and not-P are stably warrantable, since otherwise both P and not-P could be true 
together. Wright puts the problem thus: “It may also happen that some of the result-
ing enlarged states of information continue to warrant acceptance of P, and others 
acceptance of not-P. And once granted to be possible at all, it’s difficult to see how 
to exclude the thought that such a situation might persist indefinitely. In that case 
superassertibility would be relative to a starting point, an initial basis for acceptance 
or rejection. […] That would be a kind of relativity of truth.” (Wright 2006: 57). 
That is, the antirealist would have to accept relativism about (moral) truth if she were 
not in a position to “exclude the thought that such a situation might persist indefi-
nitely” (ibid.). So how might the non-relativist, i.e. objectivist antirealist, exclude 
the thought that both P and not-P might be stably warrantable or superassertible?
The answer, I think, is this. Suppose there is moral disagreement between two 
epistemically highly advanced thinkers, A and B, such that both have considered 
what appears to be all relevant non-moral information, that they have balanced a huge 
number of reasons speaking in favour and disfavour of P and not-P, that they have 
acknowledged all arguments put forward by the opposite party in the disagreement, 
and so on. And suppose that A and B improve still further and further as regards all 
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relevant aspects of their state of information, their cognitive abilities, and so on—and 
they still disagree about P. It seems quite plausible, then, to assume that “someday”, 
in a highly advanced state of information and a highly improved epistemic situation, 
they will be (to a sufficient degree) justified in believing that no further improve-
ment of the relevant kind could change their epistemic situation concerning P, that no 
matter what further improvements were made they would continue to disagree. That 
is, both thinkers, while also reflecting all this, were justified in assuming that their 
disagreement about P would last indefinitely and might be rationally irresolvable, 
in principle. So, they would be justified, and even rationally committed, to abandon 
their respective moral beliefs and stop disagreeing. Hence, even if it cannot be ruled 
out a priori that some further improvement could decide the matter and, ultimately, 
solve their initial disagreement, i.e. even if this is a logical or conceptual possibility, 
they are, in the reflective light of their knowledge about their own informational and 
epistemic situation and that of their opponent, sufficiently warranted in believing that 
their disagreement is rationally irresolvable and so justified in abandoning a belief 
about P.9 Hence they stay agnostic about P after they have reached a sufficiently high 
state of informational enhancement and epistemic improvement. And since this situa-
tion can be conceived of as persisting indefinitely, the thought appears irresistible that 
even cognitively faultless thinkers would stay agnostic in that case.
So, by this agnostic move, the objectivist antirealist seems to be able to explain 
why CFD is a misguided intuition, or accurately: why CFD is an improper ren-
dering of a plausible thought. This thought is that there are rationally irresolvable 
moral disagreements, i.e. disagreements that cannot be resolved by rational means, 
or disagreements in which not even cognitively faultless thinkers would finally come 
to a moral agreement. And, as already pointed out, this does not imply that such 
disagreements would persist indefinitely, as CFD has it. So, objectivist antirealism 
seems to be off the hook.
Yet, unfortunately, this agnostic move doesn’t seem viable for the objectiv-
ist antirealist, since a denial of CFD via the agnostic move contradicts EC—and, 
decisively, does so even in EC’s weak reading, which is entailed by her epistemic 
conception of truth. That is to say, if there is no cognitively faultless thinker who 
accepts a proposition P, i.e. if P isn’t knowable, then, via contraposition of EC, it fol-
lows not-P, and if there is no such thinker who accepts not-P, it follows the negation 
of not-P. So, the agnostic move conjoint with weak EC implies a contradiction: not-P 
and its negation, not–not-P. The upshot is, since the objectivist antirealist seems to 
be committed to abandoning the agnostic move but also to rejecting CFD, she seems 
to be committed to the view that cognitively faultless thinkers agree on every moral 
proposition—a conclusion that I already rejected as outright implausible.10
9 This, of course, presupposes that the relevant thinkers do not believe that any moral disagreement is 
rationally solvable, at least in principle.
10 Tersman (2006: 76–82) discusses a yet unmentioned strategy for arguing against CFD, which he calls 
the semantic move. Cognitively faultless thinkers, if they do not agree, do not disagree, rather they talk 
past each other, since—by relying on the principle of charity—we have to interpret their moral language 
or idiolect such that their disagreement is merely apparent. However, it seems rather implausible that 
even after durable disputing some moral question this linguistic mistake remained undetected by highly 




5  Logical Revision: Intuitionistic Logic
Is this the end of our antirealist story? At first glance, a restriction to intuitionistic 
logic, prominently advocated by Wright (1992, 2002), and even motivated by the 
antirealist’s epistemic conception of truth, seems to offer a solution. For, as Wright 
(2002, 2006) pointed out, it does—within the limits of intuitionistic logic—not 
follow from a denial of CFD that all cognitively faultless thinkers agree on every 
moral proposition P. Put more precisely: it doesn’t follow that cognitively faultless 
thinkers have the same doxastic stance towards P, since it only follows that they 
do not disagree, i.e. do not not-agree. And since intuitionistically Double Negation 
Elimination is not valid, a denial of CFD seems to be unproblematic. That is, objec-
tivist antirealists might deny CFD without being committed to the view that there 
would always be agreement between cognitively faultless thinkers.11 For clarity’s 
sake, I’ll distinguish two senses of “agreement”. In the narrow sense, agreement is 
moral agreement, i.e. both thinkers hold the same moral belief as regards a proposi-
tion P. In the wide sense, both thinkers in the agreement just take the same doxas-
tic stance towards P, i.e. they either morally agree or stay agnostic about P. So, a 
denial of CFD—intuitionistically—does not imply that cognitively blameless think-
ers always agree in the wide sense. Hence, by adopting intuitionistic logic for the 
moral discourse, the inacceptable conclusion that all cognitively faultless thinkers 
would always agree (in the wide sense)—either by moral agreement or by taking an 
agnostic stance—can be omitted.12 But this intuitionistic move raises the following 
problems:
(i) The restriction to intuitionistic logic, or the rejection of the Law of Excluded 
Middle, is motivated by the peculiarity of the moral discourse and moral truth, and 
so is applicable, initially, only to the moral discourse itself, rather than to the philo-
sophical or meta-ethical or even empirical discourse about moral beliefs, moral dis-
agreements, doxastic stances towards moral propositions and so on. Compare: the 
restriction to intuitionistic logic as regards mathematics and the mathematical dis-
course does not necessarily imply intuitionistic logic for meta-mathematics, the logic 
of which usually is construed classical. Applying intuitionistic logic to meta-mathe-
matics is in need of argument. That is to say, an extension of intuitionistic logic from 
the moral discourse to its meta-discourse is in need of a specific motivation as well, 
since the objectivist antirealist’s epistemic conception of truth, which appears to be 
11 Note that all the logical moves made in order to derive a contradiction from the agnostic-stance 
assumption and EC go through within the limits of intuitionistic logic. So even the objectivist antirealist 
with intuitionistic inclinations has to admit that cognitively faultless thinkers never stay agnostic about 
any moral proposition. But they also never disagree. So, doesn’t it follow that they agree on every moral 
proposition? What else should they do? See below, problem (ii).
12 By his intuitionistic move Wright also avoids that the denial of CFD implies realism via satisfying 
Cognitive Command (e.g. Wright 1992: 92–94), which, in short, says that it is a priori that any disagree-
ment does involve a cognitive shortcoming. For a denial of CFD, i.e. the negation of “It is possible that 
some disagreement does not involve a cognitive shortcoming” does—intuitionistically—not imply that 
necessarily any disagreement does involve such shortcoming, which in turn would imply realism via sat-
isfying Cognitive Command.
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the main, if not the only rationale for her intuitionistic revision of logic, is restricted 
to the moral discourse, while the meta-ethical, philosophical or empirical discourse 
(about moral beliefs, their justification and so on) is not affected, at least not affected 
from the outset. And to the extent to which there seems to be no motivation for an 
intuitionistic logical restriction of the meta-ethical discourse, or the overall philo-
sophical discourse (since there isn’t any clear division of meta-ethics and the rest of 
philosophy), or the empirical discourse about mental states, there are no ways and 
means to block the transition from denying disagreement to endorsing agreement—
in the wide sense at least. So, after all, it seems hard to deny: if cognitively blame-
less thinkers do not disagree, they morally agree or stay agnostic.
(ii) Even if we concede that intuitionistic logic is appropriate for the meta-dis-
course of morality as well, such logical revision doesn’t seem to be of much help. 
The problem is this. Granted, the antirealist, due to her restriction to intuitionistic 
logic, can—in general—block any logical transition from the double negation of 
some proposition P to P itself, and so the transition from a denial of disagreement 
to agreement in the wide sense. But in the case under consideration it is a legiti-
mate and urgent question as to what doxastic stance cognitively faultless thinkers 
would take towards a moral proposition P when they do not disagree about P. On 
the grounds of conceptual considerations about human belief and cognition there are 
only three doxastic stances towards a proposition P that can be adopted: to believe 
P or to believe not-P (or both, at the expense of inconsistency) or to stay agnostic 
about P. Thus two cognitively faultless thinkers can only take the following stances 
towards P: (a) both thinkers agree as regards P, i.e. either they both believe P or they 
both believe not-P, (b) they both stay agnostic about P, i.e. they neither believe P nor 
believe not-P, or (c) they disagree, i.e. one thinker believes P and the other thinker 
believes not-P or at least something logically incompatible with P, or vice versa.13 
So, after all, it seems to be a priori—true on purely conceptual grounds, though not 
true on purely logical grounds—that cognitively faultless thinkers, when they do not 
disagree, either morally agree or stay agnostic. The upshot is that objectivist antire-
alists, since they have to reject CFD, are committed either to a convergence view, 
i.e. the view that all cognitively faultless thinkers agree in the narrow sense on every 
moral proposition, or to admitting an agnostic stance on the part of cognitively fault-
less thinkers about some moral propositions. But the former is highly implausible 
(see above) and the latter contradicts the objectivist antirealist’s conception of moral 
truth.
In conclusion, the objectivist antirealist faces a dilemma: CFD gives rise to a con-
tradiction via the EC-Deduction, so that she has to deny CFD, since she (in contrast 
to the realist) is not in a position to draw on an equivocation as regards knowabil-
ity. However, a denial of CFD contradicts EC since such denial is only plausible by 
drawing on an agnostic stance on the part of cognitively faultless thinkers (because 
13 It can be ruled out that just one of them is agnostic about P, or more generally speaking, that some 
cognitive faultless thinkers stay agnostic about P and some other such thinkers believe P or believe not-P, 
since they are cognitively faultless and so epistemically on a par. The reasons for one such thinker to be 
agnostic about P are the reasons for any other such thinker to stay agnostic as well.
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a convergence view is highly questionable). But the agnostic move contradicts the 
objectivist antirealist’s conception of moral truth, even within intuitionistic limits. Is 
this, finally, the end of objectivist antirealism?
6  Logical Revision: A Three‑Valued Logic for the Moral Discourse
The crucial problem with the antirealist’s agnostic move is that it implies a contra-
diction via contraposition of even weak EC: if it is not possible that a cognitively 
faultless thinker believes that P, then not-P; and if it is also not possible that such 
thinker believes that not-P, then not not-P. So, if the objectivist antirealist could 
somehow block this logical transition, and so prevent the contradiction, she could 
make her saving agnostic move. This would also explain the actual existence of 
persistent moral disagreement by the assumption that such disagreement either per-
sistently involves some undetected epistemic shortcoming that gives rise to a false 
belief or that it involves an undetected rational shortcoming that yields a belief when 
it is rational to stay agnostic.14 But how should objectivist antirealists block the fatal 
logical transition from the agnostic stance on the part of cognitively faultless think-
ers to the denial of EC in the first place? Recall, not even a restriction to intuitionis-
tic logic is of help here.
Hence an alternative, in a sense more radical logical revision for the moral dis-
course seems to be required: a suitable three-valued logic with its truth-values—
True, False and Indeterminate—epistemically construed, and so precisely in line 
with our antirealist’s epistemic account of moral truth. So, for any moral proposition 
P:
P is true iff P is superassertible
P is false iff not-P is superassertible
P is indeterminate iff neither P nor not-P is superassertible.
That neither P nor not-P is superassertible, i.e. neither P nor not-P is stably war-
rantable, means that any cognitively sufficiently improved thinker abstains from a 
moral view regarding P and stably stays agnostic about P. As regards this indetermi-
nate case we can assume symmetry concerning the doxastic stances of cognitively 
sufficiently improved, or cognitively faultless, thinkers, since such thinkers are cog-
nitively on a par: if some of them stably stay agnostic, then all such thinkers stay 
so. Thus, it is ruled out that some cognitively sufficiently improved thinkers stably 
14 So, according to objectivist antirealism, any moral disagreement actually does involve a cognitive 
shortcoming. This, however, does not imply realism via satisfying Wright’s Cognitive Command con-
straint (e.g. Wright 1992: 92–94; see also footnote 12). If there are indeterminate moral propositions P, it 
involves a mistake, or a cognitive shortcoming, to believe P or to believe not-P. So satisfying Cognitive 
Command does not imply realism, provided the relevant discourse is construed as (possibly) contain-
ing indeterminate propositions. Wright didn’t take into consideration this possibility when he introduced 
Cognitive Command, which says that a discourse exhibits Cognitive Command if it is a priori that any 
disagreement does involve a cognitive shortcoming. So Cognitive Command should be revised in order 
to imply realism: a discourse exhibits Cognitive Command if it is a priori that any disagreement does 
involve an untrue belief on the part of exactly one side of the disagreement.
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believe a moral proposition and some others do not. So, all such thinkers take the 
same doxastic stance: either they all stably warrant (believe) the same concerning a 
moral proposition P, i.e. they all morally agree on P, or they all stay agnostic about 
P. So they always agree in their doxastic stance. This, of course, is not to say that 
there is always moral agreement among them, since in the agnostic-stance case such 
thinkers do not morally agree—they rather agree not to morally agree, for which rea-
son they stay agnostic and assume the indeterminacy of the proposition in question.
The truth-functions remain classic as long as indeterminacy is not involved, and 
the truth-functions as regards indeterminacy suggest themselves:
(NEG)  P is indeterminate iff not-P is indeterminate
(CON)  A conjunction is indeterminate iff either both conjuncts are indetermi-
nate or one conjunct is indeterminate and the other conjunct is true
(DIS)  A disjunction is indeterminate iff either both disjuncts are indeterminate 
or one disjunct is indeterminate and the other disjunct is false
(COND)  The conditional is defined in the usual manner via negation and 
disjunction
The basic truth-value tables are15:
This trivalent logic does prevent, as desired, the contradiction derived from the 
agnostic-stance assumption via contraposition of EC, since it does not endorse 
the Law of Excluded Middle. If cognitively sufficiently improved thinkers would 
stably stay agnostic about P, so that neither P nor not-P is superassertible, i.e. 
15 These are the tables of Kleene’s well-known three-valued system K3.
 M. Harth 
1 3
neither P nor not-P is true, it doesn’t follow—via “P is not true”—that not-P is 
true. For it solely follows that not-P is true or P is indeterminate. And from the 
agnostic-stance assumption it also doesn’t follow—via “not-P is not true”—that 
not–not-P (= P) is true. It solely follows that not–not-P (= P) is true or not-P is 
indeterminate. So the stable agnostic stance on the part of cognitively sufficiently 
improved (or cognitively faultless) thinkers does not imply the fatal contradic-
tion that not-P is true and not–not-P (= P) is true. Rather, the assumption that 
neither P nor not-P is superassertible implies, since it is logically impossible that 
not-P and not–not-P are true together, that P is indeterminate—which, of course, 
matches the antirealist’s claim that cognitively faultless or cognitively sufficiently 
improved thinkers stably stay agnostic about P.
It isn’t and can’t be the aim of this paper to develop in the full extent a three-
valued logic for moral discourse—fully developed and philosophically motivated 
three-valued logical systems are at hand in the literature (e.g. Haack 1978; Priest 
2008; Rescher 1969). Rather, my primary aim was to point out that a suitable 
three-valued logic is congenial to the antirealist’s epistemic conception of moral 
truth as superassertibility and provides the proper logical revision the objectivist 
antirealist was looking for in order to cope with the challenge posed by the argu-
ment from faultless disagreement and the EC-Deduction. The challenge raised 
by the possibility of cognitively faultless moral disagreement, CFD, was this: 
accepting CFD contradicts the epistemic constraint on truth, EC, and denying 
CFD either yields a highly implausible convergence view—cognitively blameless 
thinkers morally agree (in the narrow sense) on every proposition—or enforces 
the agnostic move, which also contradicts EC. The trivalent logic indicated here 
provides a solution to this dilemma: it allows the objectivist antirealist rejecting 
CFD by making the agnostic move without contradicting EC. Hence objectivist 
realism conjoint with such logical revision seems to be a highly attractive meta-
ethical theory: it inherits the main virtue commonly ascribed to realism alone, 
viz. moral objectivity, but shuns realism’s main vices, notably the difficulty to 
cope with the correlation challenge.
Of course, such a trivalent revision of logic is not without problems and draw-
backs (which, in my opinion, are outweighed by the benefits of objectivist antireal-
ism). These are, among other things:
(i) There are no tautologies in this logic. For example, “P or not-P” is indetermi-
nate, if P is indeterminate, and not, as might be expected, true. So, “Lying is wrong 
or lying is not wrong” is not a logical truth, because at truth-value I of “Lying is 
wrong” the disjunction is indeterminate. Intuitively, however, “Lying is wrong or 
lying is not wrong” is always true regardless of whether “Lying is wrong” is true 
or otherwise. So, this logic is a bit counterintuitive in this point. For why should 
our moral discourse be free of tautologies? The same applies to apparent contradic-
tions like “Lying is wrong and lying is not wrong”: Logical falsehoods also do not 
exist in this logic. In defence, it may be argued that any formal logic has its peculiar 
contra-intuitive cases, such as classical logic as regards the conditional. Moreover, 
our intuitions regarding moral discourse and moral language are shaped by the tradi-
tion of classical logic, so that any revision of logic must reckon with such or other 
contra-intuitive cases.
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All in all—and one should also consider how counterintuitive a relativist logic 
is, in which the statements “Lies are wrong” and “Lies are not wrong” do not neces-
sarily contradict each other, or how contra-intuitive even the non-cognitivist “logic” 
is—the absence of tautologies should not be too great an objection to this trivalent 
logic. After all, it is a comparatively well-established logic.
(ii) Another problem might be the so-called Frege–Geach problem, originally 
raised against non-cognitivism or expressivism: If moral sentences are not truth-
apt (and thus are not apt for logical considerations at all), how are mixed sentences 
or mixed arguments, i.e. those consisting of moral and non-moral components, to 
be treated logically or semantically? Applied to our logical revision the problem 
might be this: Which logic is (to be) followed in mixed propositions or arguments? 
However, it isn’t clear to me what exactly the problem is. One might also ask, for 
example: Is there such a problem with an intuitionistic revision of logic in a cer-
tain domain, e.g. mathematics or ethics, while other discourses remain classical? It 
seems that the problem, if there is any at all, is a general one, i.e. one that concerns 
any logical revision. Of course, such questions must be addressed—and I must leave 
the problem to future research.
(iii) Is it possible to extend the trivalent logic from propositional logic to predi-
cate logic or modal logic? Since my revision is intended exclusively for moral 
discourse, i.e. only for moral propositions themselves, and not for the meta-level 
discourse, modalities can actually remain ignored. But the question concerning a 
trivalent predicate logic for moral discourse remains (which I am up to now not in a 
position to answer).
Within the framework of this paper these and other issues cannot, of course, be 
dealt with satisfactorily. The paper sees itself in this respect “only” as programmatic, 
it tries to set the agenda for future research in the direction of a middle-ground meta-
ethical view. It is thus intended, especially as far as the trivalent logic is concerned, 
also as a stimulus and suggestion for future research in the direction of such a view, 
which in my opinion is an attractive position, but is currently largely disregarded in 
the debate.
The upshot is, in the face of the epistemological problems of robust realism, 
objectivist antirealism, on balance, seems to be the preferable overall account. And 
as regards the (main) antirealist alternatives, viz. non-cognitivism, error theory, fic-
tionalism and relativism, the situation seems to be analogous; at least, it is fair to 
say, objectivist antirealism in conjunction with a suitable three-valued logic for the 
moral discourse, arguably, is not in a worse position.
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